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ABSTRACT
This paper presents an agriculture-focused computable general equilibrium model that can be used
to analyze the economy-wide impacts of changes in technology, market structure, and the foreign
exchange rate on resource allocation, production, and trade in Indonesia. The model includes a
specification of the rice market and the government price-support, stocking, and trade policies for
rice. Using a mixed complementarity approach, the model incorporates inequalities and changes in
policy regime as prices and/or stocks move within specified bands. The model is used to examine
the impact on the Indonesian economy of changes in rice yield and exchange rates given different
assumptions about the operations of BULOG (National Logistic Agency). An important result is that
there is inefficient allocation of resources within agriculture and the rest of the economy if BULOG
operates to maintain the rice price when there are significant increases in rice productivity or changes
in the exchange rate. With increased productivity in rice, the price support scheme retains resources
in rice production that would be better used in other, high value, agriculture. With devaluation,
maintaining a low rice price discriminates against rice producers and hence slows the process of
structural adjustment. In addition, the price support program is costly and strains the government
accounts, even if the administrative costs of operating the program are ignored.
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Food policy in Indonesia aims to achieve food security by increasing food production, raising
farm income, improving nutritional status of the people, and ensuring the availability of food
supplies at affordable prices (BULOG 1996). For the last 27 years, Indonesian food policy has
centered on rice, the most important staple crop. Since the early 1970s, rice policy in Indonesia has
sought to attain food self sufficiency through price support, price stabilization, and public investment
policies (Pearson et al., 1991). Indonesia's state monopoly, BULOG (national logistic agency), is in
charge of carrying out the state's current rice policies, which center around four main objectives: (1)
setting a “high enough” floor price to stimulate production; (2) establishing a ceiling price which
assures a reasonable price for consumers; (3) maintaining sufficient range between these two prices
to provide traders and millers a reasonable profit after holding rice between crop seasons; and (4)
keeping an “appropriate” price relationship between domestic and international markets. BULOG’s
implementation of  these price support and price stabilization policies for rice involves setting a floor
price and a ceiling price, procuring paddy or milled rice, managing stocks, and controlling quality
and distribution, as well as importing and exporting. BULOG's efforts to achieve commodity price
stabilization has been acclaimed for its contribution to Indonesia's political stability and development
(Timmer 1989). 
With an unparalleled record in achieving rice self sufficiency during the late 1980s and early
1990s, Indonesia-- in the middle of the current Asian crisis-- is suffering from a prolonged drought
and unsuccessful recent harvests. It has been estimated that Indonesia will need to import between
4.4 million and 8.0 million tonnes of rice in 1998, which amounts to about 25 to 40 percent of world
trade in rice (Economist 1998: 39). To meet this considerable challenge, the government will need
to provide BULOG with foreign exchange reserves to finance rice imports to provide enough food
to support consumer prices. These developments have fueled the ongoing debate in Indonesia
regarding BULOG interventions in the rice market.
In order to assess the economy-wide impacts of commodity market interventions, this study
presents an agriculture-focused computable general equilibrium (AG-CGE) model for Indonesia.
This analytical framework focuses on agriculture and on links between the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors. The model can be used for analyzing the impacts of changes in production
technology, protection, subsidies, and the exchange rate on resource allocation, production,
employment, and trade. The model incorporates a specification of the rice market and the role of
BULOG, and is used to examine how changes in rice yield affect the economy under different
scenarios concerning BULOG’s management of the rice market. We also consider the impact of
changes in the exchange rate.
II. THE MODEL
Table 1 presents an aggregate “macro” SAM (Social Accounting Matrix) for Indonesia for
the benchmark year 1990, while Table 2 shows the level of disaggregation of the macro SAM
underlying our AG-CGE model.  Specifying a complete model requires that the market, behavioral,
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and system relationships embodied in each account in the SAM be represented in the model
structure. The activity, commodity, and factor accounts all require the specification of market




accounts embody the private and public sector budget constraints (income equals expenditure).
Finally, the capital and world accounts represent the macroeconomic requirements for internal
(saving equals investment) and external (exports plus capital inflows equal imports) balance.    
2
Our AG-CGE model for Indonesia is a static general equilibrium model of a small, open
economy of the type discussed in Dervis, de Melo, and Robinson (1982) and Devarajan, Lewis, and
Robinson (1994). The model structure is designed with an emphasis on the agriculture sector and
an explicit modeling of BULOG price support behavior formulated as a mixed complementarity
problem (MCP).  Table 3 lists the equations describing the behavior of BULOG as part of the AG-
3
CGE model. The remaining model equations are reported in Appendix Tables 1-6.  
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In the AG-CGE model, BULOG is assumed to support producer and consumer prices within
a plus-or-minus price band that is set exogenously. Inequalities (1) and (2) in Table 3 describe the
producer and consumer price support scheme, respectively. In (1), the producer price of rice (PX)
is not allowed to fall below an exogenously set level determined by a floor price (pxtarg) and an
allowed price band (dpxtarg). Similarly, the consumer price of rice (PC) cannot exceed a pre-
determined ceiling price (pctarg) and an allowed price band (dpctarg). There is a complementary
slackness relationship between the producer-price and consumer-price inequalities and the BULOG
stocking and de-stocking variables. For example, if PC hits the ceiling price plus the allowed band,
say because of poor harvest, BULOG will start selling rice from its existing stocks,   as
defined in equation (5). The stock equals initial stocks (stk ) plus the net of BULOG's domestic and
o
international trade activities. When stock levels are low and hit the lower bound, BULOG will
experience a period of stock accumulation by purchasing from domestic and international sources.
Equation (6) and inequality (7) introduce a policy tool to maintain a ceiling on fertilizer price.
Equation (6) distinguishes the consumer price of a composite good (PC) and the price for composite
goods (PQ) by including a fixed consumption subsidy/tax parameter (tc) and a subsidy variable
(SPC)-- in stead of a quantity demand variable, as in the case of rice. Inequality (7) imposes a ceiling
on PC by exogenously setting pcup – the ceiling level – as a proportion of PC. If PQ goes up, i
pushing the consumer price (PC) to exceed the ceiling price level, the subsidy variable, SPC, which
is initially set to zero, adjusts by assuming a positive value, and thus maintains the consumer price
at a level that satisfies the inequality in (7). Again, there is a complementary slackness relationship
between SPC and PC. If the PC inequality is strict, SPC is zero. Otherwise, SPC will be positive.
The model solves for domestic commodity and factor prices that equate supply and demand
in all goods and factor markets. Traded and non-traded goods are assumed to be distinct by sector,
with imports and exports being imperfect substitutes for goods produced in Indonesia and sold on
the domestic market. The model incorporates a realistic degree of insulation of domestic commodity
markets from world markets, but the links are still important. The model specifies an equilibrium
relationship between the balance of trade (in goods and non-factor services, or the current account
balance) and the real exchange rate (which measures the average price of traded goods — exports
and imports — relative to the average price of domestically produced goods sold on the domestic
market). 
The aggregate consumer price index is the “numeraire” price index for the model, which
means that the model base solution is a “no inflation” benchmark. All solution prices should be seen3
as relative to the consumer price index. The equilibrium exchange rate in the model can be
interpreted as the real effective exchange rate, deflated by the Indonesian consumer price index. The
exchange rate variable in the model is not a financial exchange rate, since the model has no assets,
asset markets, or inflation. 
III. BASE SOLUTION, POLICY EXPERIMENTS, AND RESULTS
The base run of the model starts from the benchmark SAM for 1990, and then updates
indirect tax rates and tariff rates to 1995 values (see Robinson et al., 1997). We assume a 30 percent
wedge between world export and import prices of rice facing BULOG when it operates in world
markets, or plus and minus 15 percent, relative to the initial domestic price. The new base solution
of the AG-CGE model is thus an updated 1990 base, with some data from 1995. This base solution
provides the benchmark against which results from various experiments are compared. Table 4
presents this base solution and is organized to focus on the agriculture sector. The table lists sectoral
value added, output, trade, trade ratios, and values of various elasticity parameters. According to
Table 4, agriculture value added is 26.4 percent of total value added, of which, 16.2 percent is from
Food crops, 3.5 percent from Other agriculture, 2.6 percent from Livestock, 1.9 percent from
Forestry, and 2.1 percent from Fishery. The table also shows how value added is distributed among
other non-agriculture sectors.
Rice Productivity Experiments
We consider three sets of experiments where rice productivity shocks are introduced: (1) an
adverse productivity shock, (2) a favorable productivity shock, and (3) a favorable productivity shock
where BULOG does not intervene in the rice market. To simulate rice productivity changes, we
change the shift parameter in the production function for rice. Such changes can be interpreted as
resulting from a temporary shock (e.g., weather, drought) or a permanent change (e.g., adopting new
technology). In either case, we assume that the economy adjusts to the change, achieving a new
market equilibrium. 
For the first set of experiments, an adverse production shock, rice productivity is decreased
in a series of five cumulative experiments. In each, rice productivity falls 5 percent, for a cumulative
total of 25 percent decline in experiment 5. The second and the third set of experiments are similar,
with sets of five cumulative experiments.
In the first two sets of experiments, BULOG is assumed to stabilize producer and consumer
prices within a plus-or-minus band of five 5 percent.  The nature of BULOG intervention depends
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on the direction of the price change.  In the first set, with rice productivity falling (by 5 to 25
6
percent), there will be excess demand for rice and consumer prices will tend to rise. When the
consumer price of rice hits the ceiling of the price band, BULOG intervenes by selling enough
quantities of rice in the domestic market to satisfy the excess demand. BULOG first sells rice from
its buffer stocks. In the model's stylization of BULOG behavior, once the buffer stock hits its lower
limit, BULOG starts importing, buying rice on the international market at the prevailing spot price.
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The productivity increase experiments are symmetric. The productivity increase generates an excess
supply of rice, which should cause producer prices to fall. When the producer price hits the floor4
value, BULOG intervenes by purchasing rice from the domestic market to maintain the market price
at the floor value. As BULOG purchases rice, it first replenishes its buffer stock. When stocks are
at maximum target levels, BULOG starts exporting at the spot world export price (which is assumed
to be 30 percent below the spot world import price). 
Devaluation Experiments
We consider two sets of experiments where real exchange rate depreciation is introduced
with and without intervention by BULOG in the rice market. In these experiments, the real exchange
rate is fixed and the model solves endogenously for the equilibrium value of the balance of trade.
In the first set, there is no BULOG intervention and the real exchange rate is devalued in a series of
five steps of  3 percent each, for a cumulative total of 15 percent devaluation in experiment 5. The
second set is similar, but BULOG does intervene in the rice market. The model’s stylization of
BULOG behavior follows the same assumptions adopted in the rice productivity experiments: a 5
percent plus or minus price band around producer and consumer prices, and a 3.5 percent buffer
stocks of the initial level of rice production. 
In these experiments, which explore the impact on Indonesia of major devaluation under
different adjustment scenarios, we assume that producers and consumers react to changes in prices
following supply and demand functions (derived from profit and utility maximization) in the medium
run. During and after the Rupiah crisis in 1997-1998, there was a widespread hoarding of rice and
other commodities by consumers. We can model this phenomenon as exogenously specified
increases in inventory accumulation, but have not done so in the experiments reported below. We
do some sensitivity analysis of our results to changes in inventory accumulation of rice, and report
the qualitative results in the next section. 
Results
Rice Productivity Decline
When rice productivity declines, the consumer price of rice tends to increase, prompting
BULOG intervention to maintain the price within the 5 percent band. Tables 5, 6, and 7 list the
results of this policy experiment. Table 5 shows the effect of the productivity decline on the
government account. Initially, when rice productivity drops by 5 percent, there is a decline in
government expenditure, because BULOG is earning money by selling from its buffer stock.
However, as rice productivity continues to decline and BULOG intervenes more, net government
expenditure rises as BULOG is forced to purchase imports (at spot world prices) to maintain the
buffer stock at its minimum target level. The information on BULOG purchases/sales and BULOG
imports/exports indicate how BULOG is intervening in the rice market. As rice productivity declines
by 5 percent, BULOG sales increase from zero in the base year to 0.25 billion Rp., and BULOG
imports remain unchanged since sales from existing buffer stocks are sufficient to maintain the
consumer price for rice within the band. However, as rice productivity falls by 10 percent, or more,
the volume of BULOG intervention in the rice market increases. BULOG sales cause buffer stocks
to hit their lower limit, and BULOG starts importing. Below 10 percent, BULOG operations involve
only increasing imports, which is reflected in the net government expenditure figures. Imports
increase and the program becomes more costly. 5
consumer price of rice (PC) hits the price ceiling when productivity falls by 5 percent. Since a 5
percent price band on rice prices is maintained (consumer and producer prices), the percentage
change in PC from its base value remains the same with further declines in rice productivity. Price
stabilization becomes more costly as rice productivity falls. BULOG has to pay for imports at fixed
world prices, but the domestic price increases as the exchange rate depreciates in reaction to the
increased aggregate imports. The domestic output of rice (X) falls with the productivity decline. The
supply of rice (Q) falls by less, as BULOG sells stocks and imports. 
At the macro level, the aggregate effects of an adverse rice productivity shock, shown in
Table 7, include a significant contraction in real GDP (-4.3 percent with a 25 percent decline in rice
productivity), as rice output falls. Government consumption net of BULOG sales fall, while imports
increase. The increase in real imports leads to a significant depreciation of the real exchange rate (2.8
percent). The depreciation has required to generate additional exports to pay for the additional
imports. Both aggregate exports and imports increase. The macro impact of this scenario is
significant, even though rice has a relatively small share of value added (about 8.4 percent). BULOG
operations matter at the economy-wide level. 
Rice Productivity Improvement 
When rice productivity improves, the fall in the producer price of rice prompts BULOG
intervention to maintain the 5 percent price band. Tables 8, 9, and 10 present the results of this policy
experiment. Similar to the productivity decline experiment, Table 8 shows the impact of a favorable
productivity shock in the rice market on the government accounts, Table 9 provides detailed results
for the rice sector, and Table 10 lists the aggregate effects. 
This experiment is the reverse of the first one, but the results are not perfectly symmetrical.
In this case, BULOG operations will be reversed. Instead of selling rice to reduce excess demand,
BULOG will have to purchase it to reduce the excess supply. Production of rice increases by 39
percent under a 25 percent increase in productivity (Table 9). Instead of importing rice to support
its sales, BULOG will export surplus rice in excess of its stocking needs.  Given that import prices
of rice are much higher than export prices, when BULOG intervenes by selling rice on the world
market, the export earnings are less than the corresponding import costs for the same amount of rice
when BULOG imported rice in the first experiment. Table 8 shows how BULOG purchases and
exports increase as rice productivity improves. 
BULOG operations lose money (see the first two rows of Table 8) – more than under the
productivity decline scenario. In supporting the domestic price, BULOG purchases rice at the support
price and sells at a lower price to world markets. After a 5 percent productivity improvement,
BULOG starts exporting, which causes a real appreciation of the exchange rate and changes in the
structure of production. Total government revenue falls, largely because indirect tax revenue falls.
The shift in the structure of production is towards activities with lower indirect tax rates (e.g.,
agriculture). As a result, the government deficit increases (government savings fall in the expenditure
account). 
The asymmetry of response between experiments 1 and 2 is shown by the exchange rate
effect (Table 10). In the first experiment, the exchange rate depreciates by 2.8 percent with6
productivity decline of 25 percent, while in the second the exchange rate appreciates by 2.5 percent
when productivity increases 25 percent. The difference is due to the fact that the export price of rice
is well below the import price. Increased exports generate smaller increase in earnings, and less
exchange rate appreciation is required to generate the additional imports financed by the export
earnings. 
Rice Productivity Improvement Without BULOG Intervention
This experiment is the same as experiment 2 except that there is no BULOG intervention.
Prices are free to adjust to changed market conditions. The absence of BULOG is assumed to
preclude rice export, and the domestic market is assumed to absorb all the increased supply of rice.
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The results, focusing on the differences from experiment 2, are shown in Figures 1, 2, and 3. Figure
1 shows what happens to agricultural and non-agricultural production. With BULOG intervention,
the rice sector draws resources (capital and labor) away from other sectors, forcing more resources
into agriculture than the free market would justify. For example, with a 25 percent increase in
productivity, rice output increases by only 17 percent (not tabulated), compared to 39 percent with
BULOG intervention (Table 9). Also, without BULOG intervention, net government revenue
increases (not tabulated), while in the BULOG intervention case net government revenue falls. 
Figure 2 shows the changes in agriculture and non-agriculture imports. With BULOG
intervention, the exchange rate appreciates. Without BULOG intervention, there is no increase in
rice exports (by assumption) and a slight depreciation of the exchange rate, as increased income
leads to higher demand for imports. The difference is that, with BULOG intervention, all imports
rise and there is displacement of domestic non-agricultural production – the Dutch disease. The same
effect is seen in Figure 3, which shows the comparative effects on exports. They mirror the import
effects except that, of course, agricultural exports (which include BULOG rice exports) rise while
non-agricultural exports fall. 
Figure 4 shows the differential impact of experiments 1 and 2 on the structure of agricultural
production. The effect of BULOG intervention is dramatic, keeping agricultural resources in rice that
would otherwise move to other crops, especially high-value crops such as fruits and vegetables.
Other crops are also affected significantly. 
Table 11 compares changes in GDP deflators with and without BULOG intervention with
a 25 percent increase in rice productivity. With base values equal to 100 and the consumer price
index being the numeraire, there is no effect on consumption deflators. With BULOG intervention,
consumers are relatively worse off as the deflators for all non-consumption categories fall relative
to consumer goods. Without BULOG intervention, the effects are reversed. The prices of non-
consumer goods rise relative to consumer goods, so consumers are much better off. 
Table 12 gives more detail on the changes in the real and nominal value added shares with
a 25 percent rice productivity improvement with and without BULOG. BULOG operations do not
allow large price changes, as evident from Table 11, and the gains from the rice productivity
improvement do not spread to other sectors of the economy. Without BULOG market intervention,
part of the productivity gain is spread across the rest of the economy as the output increases and
associated productivity gain leads to lower rice prices, the nominal share of rice falls while real share7
rises. In other words, the impact of BULOG intervention on the real share of value added is favorable
only to the rice sector. Without BULOG intervention, gains from rice productivity improvement
spread across the Indonesian economy.
Devaluation
The results from these experiments are summarized in Figure 5. Devaluation of the real
exchange rate leads to a shift of resources into the tradable good sectors — exports and import
substitutes (see Table 4) — and leads to both increased exports and lower imports. Figure 5a shows
the changes in aggregate real exports and imports, and Figure 5b shows the changes in the balance
of trade in goods and non-factor services (the current account balance) in 1990 U.S. dollars. Changes
in the value of agricultural production are shown in Figure 5c.  
Without BULOG intervention, changes in the exchange rate cause changes in border prices
that are passed through to the domestic market. With BULOG intervention, the government prevents
the domestic price of rice from rising along with the devaluation. If rice were not exported or
imported, it would act as a non-traded good, and the devaluation would lead to a relative fall in its
price (since the price of traded goods would rise). With BULOG intervention, the price of rice is
maintained at its current level, which is higher than that of non-traded goods but much lower than
the border price of rice (which equals the world price times the exchange rate). 
From Figure 5a, without BULOG intervention, rice is traded and the devaluation leads to a
larger effect on both exports and imports relative to the effect when BULOG controls the price of
rice. Figure 5b shows the effect on the balance of trade. With BULOG intervention, a given
devaluation leads to a smaller improvement in the balance of trade. For example, with a 15 percent
real devaluation, the trade balance improves by $39 billion without BULOG intervention and by $27
billion when BULOG intervenes. In effect, BULOG intervention hinders the process of structural
adjustment, preventing price changes that would lead to needed changes in demand and reallocation
of factors in response to the devaluation. 
Figure 5c shows the impact of devaluation on agricultural production. With BULOG
intervention to keep the price down, rice production falls, leading to a slight decline in aggregate
agricultural production.  Without BULOG intervention, rice behaves as a tradable good and the
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devaluation leads to a significant increase in price and production. Total agricultural production
rises, and there is some reallocation of resources away from lightly-traded agricultural goods (such
as fruits and vegetables) toward rice and other traded goods (e.g., coconut and palm oil). 
V. CONCLUSION
Starting from an agriculture-focused computable general equilibrium model of Indonesia, we
have modeled the behavior of Indonesia's rice policy as implemented by BULOG. We use a mixed
complementarity approach that allows the specification of inequalities and shifts of policy regime
as prices and/or stocks move within specified bands. We use this model to explore the impact on the
Indonesian economy of changes in the productivity of rice production under different assumptions8
about the operation of BULOG, and changes in the real exchange rate. Our empirical results  support
a few conclusions. 
BULOG operations have significant impact on government accounts and macro variables.
Policy intervention in the rice market reverberates throughout the Indonesian economy, which is not
surprising given that rice production accounts for about 8.4 percent of value added (in 1990). The
links between rice and the rest of agriculture, and between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors,
are important. 
If BULOG operates to maintain the rice price when there are significant increases in rice
productivity, the results are:
• Rice production goes up dramatically, and the price support scheme attracts more resources
into rice production. Instead of releasing resources to other high-value agricultural uses (e.g.,
production of fruits and vegetables), the policy draws resources away from them. The result
is an inefficient allocation of resources within agriculture and the rest of the economy. 
• With increased rice production, BULOG price-support operations would lead to significant
subsidized rice exports. The result is an appreciation of the real exchange rate, which leads
to increased imports and a bias against other exports, especially of non-agricultural products.
The result is an inefficient allocation of resources between agriculture and non-agriculture
sectors. 
• The prices of non-consumer goods (intermediate and capital goods) fall relative to the prices
of consumer goods, especially food. Consumers are relatively worse off. 
• The price-support program is expensive and strains the government accounts, even if the
administrative costs of operating the program are ignored.
Without BULOG intervention, productivity increases in rice lead to different results, as follows; 
• Rice production increases, but by significantly less. Resources are released from the rice
sector to other higher-value agricultural and non-agricultural uses. The benefits of the
productivity increase are spread across the economy, following market linkages. 
• The price of rice falls to the world price. The relative prices of consumer goods fall, and
consumers are better off. 
• There is some depreciation of the real exchange rate and no bias against non-agricultural
exports. 
• Net government revenue increases as increased non-agricultural output generates increased
tax revenue. 
Finally, devaluation of the real exchange rate should lead to an improvement in the balance
of trade, with increased production of tradable goods— both exports and import substitutes.9
However, with BULOG intervention, rice does not behave like a tradable good. With BULOG
intervention,  compared to a situation where the rice market is free, the results are:
• Aggregate exports rise less and imports fall less. 
• The impact of the devaluation on the balance of trade is weakened. 
• Aggregate agricultural output falls instead of rising. 
Intervention in the rice market thus hinders the process of structural adjustment that would
normally take place with a major devaluation of the exchange rate. 10
1.  For a complete listing of the corresponding "Micro" SAM, see Appendix 3 in Robinson et al.,
(1997). Basic data from BPS (1994a) were used in constructing the benchmark SAM in the
present study. 
2.  See Pyatt and Round (1985) and Robinson and Roland-Horst (1989) for perspectives on SAM
based modeling. 
3.  For an introduction to complementarity problems applied to economic analysis that uses
GAMS see Rutherford (1995) or Lofgren and Robinson (1997).
4.  For a complete description of the model equations, the reader is referred to Chapter 4 in
Robinson et al. (1997).
5.  Note that we can specify more or less than 5 percent ceiling on consumer prices for rice.
6.  BULOG behavior is modeled by specifying different “regimes” defined by inequalities in
prices and buffer stocks. The regime switches are modeled using a mixed complementarity
programming model. 
7.  BULOG's buffer stock amounts to 3.5 percent of the initial level of rice production. The
buffer stock is set exogenously, and can be varied. Policy experiments can be implemented to test
the effect of varying BULOG stocking capacity in response to a productivity shock.
8.  In fact, the domestic price falls below the export price after the third step (15 percent
productivity increase). At that point, the free market should start exporting. The last two steps
thus overstate the displacement of resources out of rice. 
9.  This result is qualified and even reversed if one assumes that there is significant hoarding of
rice as observed recently. Sensitivity experiments indicate that for every percentage point of
gross rice output that is hoarded (i.e., an increase in inventory accumulation), the price of rice
goes up by roughly a percentage point. 
NOTES11
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Value Added Suppliers Institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) Total
Value Added    
(1) Labor 94027 94027
(2) Capital 90616 90616
(3) Land 13953 13953
Suppliers      
(4) Activity 355053 53288 408341
(5) Commodity 200540 127330 15502 64790 408163
Institutions          
(6) Household 94027 35855 13953 4616 242 5723 3612 158030
(7) Enterprise 54761 -4272 50489
(8) Government 9204 3064 1997 23059 -4090 33236
(9) Capital Account 24086 19667 12010 9026 64790
(10) World 50045 7519 57565
Total 94027 90616 13953 408341 408163 158030 50489 33236 64790 5756513
TABLE 2. SAM Disaggregation (Activities, Commodities, Factors, and Institutions)  
Activities/Commodities (set i/j)
Agricultural (set iag; 13 sectors)
1. Rice 6. Other food 11. Other non-food
2. Soybeans 7. Rubber 12. Livestock
3. Maize 8. Sugarcane 13. Forestry
4. Cassava 9. Coconut
5. Fruits and vegetables 10. Palm Oil
Non-agricultural (set iagn; 21 sectors)
1. Fishery 8. Fertilizer
2. Oil 9. Chemical
3. Mining 10. Petroleum refinery
4. Food processing 11. Cement
5. Furniture 12. Steel
6. Textiles 13. Other manufacturing
7. Paper 14. Construction
15. Electricity-gas-water
16. Trade
17. Restaurant and hotels




Factors of Production (set f)
Labor (10)
1. Rural paid agriculture labor 6. Urban production,               9.   Rural professional and
2. Urban paid agriculture labor     transport equipment                   managerial labor
3. Rural unpaid agriculture labor     operator, and manual labor 10. Urban professional and
4. Urban unpaid agriculture labor 7. Rural clerical sales, and
5. Rural production, transport     services labor
    equipment operator, and manual 8. Urban clerical sales and
    labor     services labor




Households (set hh; 8 sectors)
1. Agricultural worker 4. Large farmer 7. Urban lower level
2. Small farmer 5. Rural lower level
3. Medium farmer 6. Rural higher level
8. Urban higher level 
Companies
Government
Rest of the WorldPXi & pxtargi % dpxtargi $ 0 BULOG
pur
i































PCi ’ PQi (1 % tci & SPCi)
pcupi & PCi $ 0 SPCi
i 0 I
i 0 itarg (dI)

































TABLE 3. Mixed Complementary Equations of BULOG Market Intervention
# Equation Complementary  Description
variable
1. (i 0 itarg) Producer price target
floor
2. (i 0 itarg) Consumer price target
ceiling
3. (i 0 itarg) Upper bound on
BULOG’s stocks
4. (i 0 itarg) lower bound on
BULOG’s stocks
5. (i 0 itarg) BULOG’s stocks
6. (i 0 I) Consumer prices of
composite goods








Target price band for consumer prices
Target price band for producer prices
Target band on stocks
Target consumer price
Consumer price ceiling 
Target producer price
Target stock level






Consumer price of composite goods
Price of composite good 
Average output price 
Variable subsidy 15
TABLE 4. Structure of the Indonesian Economy, 1990
Sectoral composition (%)  Ratios (%) Elasticities
Value Output Domestic Exports Imports Exports/ Imports / Substitution Transformation Production
Added supply output domestic supply elasticity elasticity elasticity
(VA) (X) (Q) (E) (M) (E/X) (M/Q) (rohc) (rhot) (rhop)
Agriculture - - 26.4 19.0 19.5 3.2 2.0
    Food crops
       Rice 8.4 8.2 7.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.75 1.25 0.75
       Soybeans 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.0 8.9 0.75 1.25 0.75
       Maize 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.75 1.25 0.75
       Cassava 1.1 0.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.75 1.25 0.75
       Fruits and vegetables 4.2 2.1 2.5 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.75 1.25 0.75
       Other 1.1 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.6 3.9 5.4 0.75 1.25 0.75
       Total 16.2 12.2 12.3 0.4 1.4
    Other agriculture
       Rubber 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 4.1 0.1 0.75 1.25 0.75
       Sugarcane 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.75 1.25 0.75
       Coconut 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.75 1.25 0.75
       Palm oil 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.0 17.5 0.0 0.75 1.25 0.75
       Other 1.6 0.9 0.8 1.3 0.2 11.4 1.6 0.75 1.25 0.75
       Total 3.5 2.1 1.8 2.0 0.2
   Livestock 2.6 2.4 2.5 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.75 1.25 0.75
   Forestry 1.9 1.0 1.2 0.2 0.3 1.3 1.6 0.75 1.25 0.75
   Fishery 2.1 1.3 1.6 0.6 0.0 3.6 0.0 0.75 1.25 0.75
Non-agriculture 73.6 81.0 80.5 96.8 98.0 16.7 14.7
    Oil 13.5 6.8 3.5 22.9 4.5 27.7 8.0 0.50 1.50 0.50
    Mining 2.8 1.5 1.4 2.9 0.8 15.4 3.8 0.50 1.50 0.50
    Food processing 6.1 6.3 6.4 7.5 2.5 9.7 2.5 1.50 2.00 1.50
    Furniture 2.8 2.9 1.3 13.7 0.1 39.5 0.5 1.50 2.00 1.50
    Textiles 2.6 3.7 2.9 10.5 4.6 23.5 9.9 1.50 2.00 1.50
    Paper 0.7 0.9 1.0 0.6 1.1 5.5 6.8 1.50 2.00 1.50
    Fertilizer 0.5 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.5 9.5 4.6 0.50 2.00 0.50
    Chemical 1.1 1.6 3.6 1.6 14.1 8.3 24.4 0.50 2.00 0.50
    Petroleum refinery 4.5 5.4 3.5 18.5 2.9 28.0 5.1 0.50 1.50 0.50
    Cement 0.6 0.7 1.1 0.8 1.9 8.9 10.8 0.50 2.00 0.50
    Steel 1.1 1.4 2.0 2.7 5.3 15.4 16.9 0.50 2.00 0.50
    Other manufacturing 4.2 5.9 13.1 6.6 46.1 9.3 22.2 0.50 2.00 0.50
    Construction 7.0 10.6 9.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.50 2.00 1.50
    Electricity, gas, and water 0.9 1.2 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.50 2.00 0.50
    Trade -1.8 9.3 8.3 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.4 2.00 0.50 2.00
    Restaurants and hotels 4.2 4.1 3.7 2.0 2.0 4.0 3.4 1.25 0.50 1.25
    Transportation and communication 1.9 5.4 5.1 1.6 2.3 2.4 2.9 0.50 0.50 0.50
    Services 9.7 5.9 5.5 3.3 4.5 4.6 5.2 1.25 0.50 1.25
    Public administration 9.6 5.2 5.1 0.5 3.3 0.8 4.1 1.25 0.50 1.25
    Other services 1.6 1.4 1.4 0.0 0.9 0.2 3.9 1.25 0.50 1.25
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.016
TABLE 5. Government Accounts: Rice Productivity Decline (Rp. trillion, 1990 prices)
Rice Productivity Decline
Base
Values 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
Expenditure
      BULOG imports / (exports) 0.00 0.00 1.41 3.04 4.70 6.37
      BULOG purchases / (sales) 0.00 (0.25) (1.74) (3.16) (4.56) (5.93)
      Fertilizer subsidy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.08
      Government consumption 15.07 14.94 15.08 15.22 15.37 15.51
      Government savings 10.24 10.35 10.79 10.92 10.99 11.02
      Government transfers 5.72 5.72 5.72 5.72 5.72 5.72
Total Expenditures 31.04 30.76 31.26 31.77 32.27 32.78
Revenue
      Consumption tax / subsidy 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.05 -0.08
      Enterprise tax 21.75 21.56 21.84 22.14 22.44 22.74
      Foreign borrowing -4.09 -4.06 -4.12 -4.18 -4.24 -4.30
      Household tax 2.02 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
      Indirect taxes 8.25 8.17 8.43 8.69 8.95 9.21
      Tariff revenue 3.11 3.09 3.10 3.11 3.12 3.14
Total Revenue 31.04 30.76 31.26 31.77 32.27 32.7817
TABLE 6. Rice Prices and Quantities: Rice Productivity Decline  
 Rice Productivity Decline
Base
Values 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
Percent change in:
     Domestic price of exports  0.85 -0.77 0.65 2.19 3.73 5.25
     Domestic price of imports  1.15 -0.77 0.65 2.19 3.73 5.25
     Average output price  1.00 5.19 5.15 5.12 5.08 5.05
     Price of composite good  1.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
     Domestic activity goods price  1.00 5.19 5.16 5.12 5.08 5.05
     Domestic commodity goods price  1.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
     Consumer price of composite good  1.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
Quantity of:
     Exports  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
     Imports  0.02 0.02 1.42 2.99 4.54 6.06
Percent change in:
     Domestic output  29.71 -3.79 -12.35 -20.68 -28.8 -36.9
     Composite goods supply  30.61 -3.00 -6.95 -10.87 -14.7 -18.4
     Domestic activity sales  29.70 -3.79 -12.35 -20.69 -28.8 -36.9
     Domestic commodity sales  30.59 -3.79 -12.35 -20.69 -28.8 -36.9
  Note: For quantities, base values are in 1990 trillion Rp. 18
TABLE 7. Macro Results: Rice Productivity Decline 
Rice Productivity Decline
Base
Values 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
Percent change in real :
     GDP 209.0 -0.3 -1.3 -2.3 -3.4 -4.3
     Private consumption 128.6 -0.7 -0.7 -0.8 -1.0 -1.1
     Investment 55.6 0.8 -0.3 -1.4 -2.6 -3.7
     Government demand 15.1 -1.6 -11.0 -20.0 -28.8 -37.5
     Exports 57.4 0.0 1.8 3.7 5.7 7.6
     Imports -47.7 0.0 2.1 4.5 6.9 9.2
     Exchange rate 1.7 -0.5 0.1 1.0 1.9 2.8
  Note: Base values are in 1990 trillion Rp.
            Government demand includes BULOG purchases/sales.
            The real exchange rate is defined as the nominal exchange rate deflated by the domestic sales price                 
            index.           
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TABLE 8. Government Accounts: Rice Productivity Improvement (Rp. trillion, 1990 prices)
Rice Productivity Improvement
Base
Values 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
Expenditure
      BULOG imports / (exports) 0.00 0.00 (0.99) (2.20) (3.39) (4.57)
      BULOG purchases / (sales) 0.00 0.13 1.53 2.90 4.28 5.68
      Fertilizer subsidy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
      Government consumption 15.07 15.21 15.09 14.97 14.84 14.72
      Government savings 10.24 10.27 9.55 9.07 8.56 8.02
      Government transfers 5.72 5.72 5.72 5.72 5.72 5.72
Total Expenditures 31.04 31.34 30.90 30.46 30.02 29.58
Revenue
      Consumption tax / subsidy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
      Enterprise tax 21.75 21.94 21.72 21.48 21.24 21.00
      Foreign borrowing -4.09 -4.12 -4.08 -4.03 -3.98 -3.93
      Household tax 2.02 2.03 2.03 2.03 2.03 2.02
      Indirect taxes 8.25 8.35 8.11 7.87 7.63 7.39
      Tariff revenue 3.11 3.13 3.12 3.11 3.10 3.09
Total Revenue 31.04 31.34 30.90 30.46 30.02 29.5820
TABLE 9. Rice Prices and Quantities: Rice Productivity Improvement 
Rice Productivity improvement
Base
Values 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
Percent change in:
     Domestic price of exports  0.85 0.78 -0.30 -1.54 -2.79 -4.04
     Domestic price of imports  1.15 0.78 -0.30 -1.54 -2.79 -4.04
     Average output price  0.99 -5.00 -5.00 -5.00 -5.00 -5.00
     Price of composite good  0.99 -4.82 -4.84 -4.87 -4.90 -4.93
     Domestic activity goods price  0.99 -5.00 -5.00 -5.00 -5.00 -5.00
     Domestic commodity goods price  0.99 -4.82 -4.85 -4.87 -4.90 -4.93
     Consumer price of composite good  0.99 -4.82 -4.84 -4.87 -4.90 -4.93
Quantity of:
     Exports  0.00 0.00 0.99 2.24 3.49 4.76
     Imports  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
Percent change in:
     Domestic output 30.14 3.36 12.09 20.81 29.64 38.56
     Composite goods supply  31.05 3.35 12.08 20.80 29.63 38.57
     Domestic activity sales  30.14 3.36 12.09 20.81 29.64 38.57
     Domestic commodity sales  31.03 3.36 12.09 20.81 29.64 38.57
  Note : For quantities, base values are in 1990 trillion Rp.21
TABLE 10. Macro Results: Rice Productivity Improvement 
Rice Productivity Improvement
Base
Values 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
Percent change in real :
     GDP 209.0 0.3 1.1 2.0 3.0 3.9
     Private consumption 128.6 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5
     Investment 55.6 -0.8 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0
     Government demand 15.1 0.9 10.6 20.2 29.9 39.7
     Exports 57.4 0.0 0.5 1.1 1.8 2.5
     Imports -47.7 0.0 0.6 1.3 2.2 3.0
     Exchange rate 1.7 0.4 -0.2 -1.0 -1.7 -2.5
  Note: Base values are in 1990 trillion Rp.
            Government demand includes BULOG purchases/sales.
            The real exchange rate is defined as the nominal exchange rate deflated by the domestic sales price                 
            index.   22
TABLE 11. GDP Deflators With and Without BULOG
Intervention: Rice Productivity Improvement
                                                       GDP deflators
Base With Without
BULOG BULOG
Consumption 100 100 100
Investment 100 97 104
Government 100 97 105
Exports 100 96 104
Imports  100 96 104
GDP 100 99 10123
TABLE 12. Real and Nominal Value Added Shares: Rice Productivity Improvement (Percent)
Base shares Shares with BULOG  Shares without BULOG
Nomin Real Nominal Real Nominal Real
Agriculture
   Rice 6.6 6.7 8.7 9.1 5.4 7.5
   Fruits and  3.7 3.7 4.0 3.5 3.6 3.8
   Other Crops 5.9 5.9 6.2 5.5 5.9 6.1
   Livestock 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.3 2.4 2.4
   Forestry 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7
   Fishery 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.9
Consumer goods 9.4 9.5 8.8 9.0 9.6 9.5
Intermediate capital 22.7 22.5 21.5 21.8 22.8 22.0
Services 45.4 45.5 44.4 45.2 46.3 45.0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 10024
FIGURE 1a. Changes in the Value of Non-Agricultural
Production: Rice Productivity Improvement
 
FIGURE 1b. Changes in the Value of Agricultural
Production: Rice Productivity Improvement 25
FIGURE 2a. Changes in  the Value of Non-Agricultural
Imports: Rice Productivity Improvement 
FIGURE 2b. Changes in  the Value of Agricultural
Imports: Rice Productivity Improvement 26
FIGURE 3a. Changes in  the Value of Non-Agricultural
Exports: Rice Productivity Improvement
FIGURE 3b.
 Changes in  the Value of Agricultural
Exports: Rice Productivity Improvement 27




FIGURE 4b. Changes in the Value of Fruits and
Vegetables Production: Rice Productivity
Improvement
 
FIGURE 4c.  Changes in the Value of Other
Agriculture Production: Rice Productivity
Improvement28
FIGURE 5a. Changes in Real Exports and Real
Imports: Exchange Rate Devaluation
FIGURE 5b. Changes in the Trade Balance from
Base Values: Exchange Rate Devaluation
FIGURE 5c. Changes in the Value of Agricultural







































































































































APPENDIX TABLE A.1. Definition of Parameters and Variables in the AG-CGE Model 
Parameters
A Armington function shift parameter
CES shift parameter
CES factor share parameter 
CET function shift parameter
Input-output coefficients
B Capital composition matrix
C Consumer price weights
D Armington function share parameter
Depreciation rates
Domestic sales price weights
E Export demand constant
Export demand price elasticity
Base exchange rate
F   Factors to household map
G CET function share parameter
Government consumption shares
K Shares of investment by sector of destination
M Make matrix coefficients
P Base value added price
  Base import price
World market price of imports (in dollars)
World price of export substitutes
Price index weights
Base output price
R Armington function exponent




  Share of enterprise income to households
Enterprise shares of factor income
Share of household income transferred to
other households
T Consumption tax (+) or subsidy (-) rates 
Tax (+) or subsidy (-) rates on exports
Household tax rate
Base tariff rate Government revenue                             
Tariff rates on imports
Base indirect tax
Indirect tax rates







C Final demand for private consumption
Household consumption
Consumption tax revenue
D Domestic activity sales                       
Domestic commodity sales                      
Total depreciation expenditure                
Volume of investment by sector of destination 
Inventory investment by sector                





Export subsidy payments                       
Exchange rate (Rp. per $)  
Exports                                       
F Government foreign borrowing                  
Factor demand by sector
Labor transfers abroad                        
Net foreign savings                           
Factor supply 
Fixed capital investment                       
G Value added in market prices 
Total volume of government consumption
Final demand for government consumption 
Government to GDP ratio
Government savings                            
Government transfers to households
H Household savings                       
Household tax revenue                          
I Final demand for productive investment
Indirect tax revenue                          
Intermediates uses                            
Total investment                              
Investment to GDP ratio 
M Marginal propensity to save by household
Imports                                        
P Consumer price of composite goods
Domestic activity goods price
Domestic commodity goods price
Domestic price of exports
Consumer price index
Domestic sales price index
Producer price index  
Price of capital goods by sector of destination
Domestic price of imports
Price of composite good 
Premium income 
Value added price 
World price of exports
Average output price 









W Factor price sectoral proportionality ratios
Average factor price 
X Domestic output                              
Y Enterprise income
Factor income




























APPENDIX TABLE A.2. Price Equations
# Equation Description
1 Import prices (i 0 im)
2 Export prices (i 0 ie)
3 Export Price
4 Definition of commodity prices
5 Composite good prices
6 Producer prices
7 Value added prices net of indirect taxes 
8 Composite capital good prices
9 Producer price index  
10 Consumer price index
11 Domestic sales price index






























































































APPENDIX TABLE A.3. Quantity Equations
# Equation Description
12 CES production function
13
Demand function for primary factors
(First order condition for profit maximization
where  
14 Total intermediate use
15 Commodity/activity relationship
16 Gross domestic output as a composite good 
i 0 ie1
17 Gross domestic output  i 0 ie2
18 Gross domestic output for i 0 ien
19 Export supply for i 0 ie1
20 World export demand for i 0 ied
21 Total supply for a composite good for i 0 im
22 Total supply i 0 imn
23 First order condition for cost minimization of
composite goods (i 0 im)
 Note: ie1  = export sectors with CET function
           ie2  = sectors with no CET function (rice)
           ien  = non export sectors
           ied  = sectors with export demand
           imn = non import sectors
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27 Household disposable income
28 Tariff revenue i 0 im
29 Import premium i 0 im
30 Consumption taxes
31 Indirect taxes








Note: f      = set of factors



























42 Government savings 
43 Fixed investment
44 Real fixed investment by sector of
destination
45 Investment final demand by sector
of origin











































APPENDIX TABLE A.6. Market Clearing and Macro Economic Closures
# Equation Description
46 Goods market equilibrium
47 Factor market equilibrium
48 Current account balance
49 Saving- investment balance




53 Government to total
absorption share 
54 Investment to total
absorption share